Certifying Brutality
In the weeks since Roshawon Donley and others were brutally beaten by Troy Police officers, Troy city and policing officials have taken many opportunities to speak about the events. Routinely, they have described the officers’ actions on the scene as necessary, within department policy, and lawful. As shown in the video below, Police Commissioner Magnetto went so far as to say that were the same situation to happen again, he would wish for police to respond exactly as they did — by beating at least half a dozen patrons with baton strikes, including blows to the head.
A Department of Justice report from 2011 explains the current trends in use of force policies in US municipal and other law enforcement departments. “Most agencies do not allow baton use until the subject threatens the officer by assuming the boxer’s stance.” Policies informed by current research in use of force outcomes, criminal and civil case law classify baton strikes to the head and other areas of the body as deadly force. A model DOJ use of force policy states unequivocally that “deadly force is not limited to the use of firearms” and includes baton strikes to the “head, neck, sternum, spine, groin, or kidneys” and lists this use of force among ramming with a car and firearm use. The DOJ makes clear, “A subject who poses no imminent threat will not be struck with a baton or impact tool … During non-deadly force incidents, officers will use reasonable care to avoid striking suspects on the head, neck, sternum, spine, groin, or kidneys, as these strikes may constitute deadly force.”
It is rather clear that Federal standards for municipal and other policing differ widely from the activities officials in Troy wish to certify and advocate as standard practice. They echo a common sentiment among police. A US Department of Justice report found that about half of police agree, “Always following the rules is not compatible with getting the job done.”
Distractions and Diversions
In this same press conference Magnetto and Mayor Rosamilia released surveillance footage depicting the situation that happened after the police beat Donley and others. Rather than describing this as evidence of a police riot, they used this as evidence that anyone beaten that evening deserved it — including those beaten before this situation emerged! According to Magnetto and Rosamilia, all police actions that evening were not only desirable, but commendable as a model for future police responses. This shows clearly the character of leadership that is directing policing activity in this city. It also shows them routinely diverting attention away from the incident with Donley that started the chain of events.
Most of the outdoor footage shown in the press conference happened after the incident in the bar when one group of police officers beat Roshawon Donley, and another group of officers were beating patrons that attempted to run out the door immediately after they attacked Donley. Officers are shown in the uncut security footage beating indiscriminately on people rushing to leave, and some were shown on outdoor surveillance footage and cell phone cameras also beating on people as they left.
Local film-maker and documentarian, Jay Wilcox, asked me about what happened inside the bar where Donley and others were beaten by officers, how it fits within use of force policies and standards, and what can be done about it. You can watch the short video below should you want the details.
What happened outside after this is typical of what the Walker Commission Report called a “police riot”. A police riot is when police initiate and use indiscriminate violence in a crowd, causing an escalation of a violent confrontation. Just as civilians can be charged with “incitement to riot” after the actions of a single person or small group cause violence to escalate in a crowd, so too uniformed officers can be legitimately responsible for such incitement. In fact, state-certified police training in crowd control techniques specifically addresses the importance of preventing the escalation of violence in crowds through effective policing techniques that include and emphasize de-escalation.
Just as the situation in the bar shows the police as aggressors, as initiating and escalating violence, as the security videos continue, more and more patrons are the recipients of the violence. Police science shows very clearly that this kind of indiscriminate, escalating use of violence against crowds is likely to manufacture a situation of unrest such as this. It happens all around the world and among various demographics (i.e. including after sporting events with largely white, middle class citizens). This is something field-leading police training covers, and crowd control tactics are used specifically to avoid situations like this. This is simply how crowds are expected respond to indiscriminate deadly force being used against random people in a crowd. This happened either because the police present were not properly trained in crowd control tactics, because the department use of force guidelines and training are not in keeping with best practices, or it happened because these officers willfully neglected this training for reasons for which we could only speculate. But we can reasonably presume about half of them believed whatever policies in place are too restrictive such that following them would disable them from performing their duties, and therefore those policies ought to be broken. Was this such an incident? Were at least half a dozen officers willfully violating policy? Or, were they following Troy PD policies that are not in keeping with current best practices?
Regardless of what happened outside the bar, it does not excuse what happened with Donley inside. The officer punched him in the face or neck, then other cops jumped in, beating Donley with clubs. That situation de-escalated, and officers again tackled Donley and beat on him with clubs. That was inside a confined space, separate from the outdoors area, and where the situation was not violent or displaying any risks of violence. The situation with Donley was initiated by the police, and the deadly force used against him cannot be legitimated by something that happened elsewhere. And, it’s clear that this situation the police initiated with Donley caused other escalations to occur.
Immunity from Democratic Oversight
The responses by Mayor Rosamilia and Commissioner Magnetto are more than a certification of these reckless and brutal policing techniques, they are more than a deflection of criticism, and they are more than blatant lies about policies and best practices in policing. Rather, they are statements of unwritten but nonetheless official policies in how they will allow policing practices to continue, and how they wish for these to be categorically immune from community-level public oversight.
In a Public Safety Board meeting of the City Council held on February 12, 2014, Police Chief Tedesco and PBA President Fitzgerald both said that police reform could be desirable, but only desirable and possible if it’s a “two-way street,” that the public must trust and work with the police in order to make it possible and for the outcomes to be desirable to the police. They both implied an unwillingness of some publics to work with the police. Importantly, however, they also both said that independent, authoritative oversight of police use of force is “unrealistic.” Therefore, they have excluded from the realm of possibility any reforms that would include public oversight.
This is to be expected. As Sen found in his international research with sites including the United States, “Police unions are opposed to civilian review on a fundamental level. They believe civilian boards are categorically biased against the police because only police are in a position to comprehend the problems.” The attitudes that feed into these perceptions are reiterated by Mayor Rosamilia when he defined excessive force as something determined by police officers, only.
In response to a speaker before the council members that evening, Tedesco said that de-escalation techniques in a crowd are “unrealistic.” The New York State Certified Regional Law Enforcement Training Academy, Zone 5, course in Basic Patrol Operations instructs in “tactical alternatives useable in crowd control.” Standard training emphasizes techniques to avoid escalating violence in crowds. Does Tedesco think this instruction is just for show? Some PR exercise that should not and cannot be implemented in actual policing practices? In describing de-escalation as “unrealistic,” Tedesco has excluded from the realm of possibility that police in a situation like that should attempt the de-escalation tactics taught in any state-certified police training program.
A resident speaking before the council members on February 12 told a story about her looking out a window while the police performed a no-knock raid on her neighbor’s apartment. She said an officer pointed a gun at her, and followed up by stating the officer should have done that because it’s good police practice. Every officer in the room applauded after this statement.
The above responses by Tedesco, Fitzgerald, and the police officers in attendance at the February 12 meeting explains two things:
- they cannot refrain from demonstrating the very reason why some publics do not trust or want to work with the police when they deny the public a right to oversee police and make authoritative decisions regarding outcomes of this oversight; and
- they are committed to an unjust and unnecessarily violent model of policing.
Crippling Opposition through Enrollment
Despite admitting that policing is changing, and suggesting this change is one that places police departments under greater public scrutiny, Chief Tedesco is demanding more of the same while calling it something different. In demanding a “two-way street” be demonstrated in order to implement any changes, Tedesco is demanding that poor residents and residents of color — and particularly outspoken critics of policing — forego critique and demand for public oversight, and instead enroll into a process he and other police and city officials will control and cripple. While explicitly denying the legitimate explanations for disenfranchisement, he’s blaming those that the policing institution strategically isolate from overseeing police operations and holding them accountable. In the name of inclusion and cooperation, he has made a divide larger and more durable.
Tedesco suggested widespread statements of first-hand experiences with police violence are fraudulent. In the February 5, 2014, Public Safety Board meeting, Pastor Willie Bacote spoke of consoling victims of police brutality at the hands of the Troy PD. According to Tedesco, these are lies. The only proof Tedesco is willing to accept is their filing complaints in this department known to clear officers who were later determined to have falsely arrested, brutalized, or otherwise abused their authority with Troy residents and visitors. How cunning of Tedesco to pose this fatal choice. Either the claims of abuse are to be dismissed as baseless and manufactured in the event that victims do not report their complaints to the Troy PD; or, these victims will have to potentially self-incriminate (in violation of their Fifth Amendment rights), make available evidence that could be used in civil suits against the officer(s) and/or department, and render their case unlikely to be taken by most lawyers expert in excessive force cases. How convenient! It’s all win-win for Tedesco and the Troy PD, and all lose-lose for victims of brutal Troy police.
But these are the stakes when one man makes all final determinations about policy and legal violations by uniformed officers. This is precisely why an independent, civilian- led and staffed review board is the suitable option for public oversight of police. This board should have subpoena power, ability to suspend and terminate officers, and issue charges to the District Attorney. Enrollment into a process ultimately unilaterally controlled by the Chief of Police is not what residents and visitors need to emerge from this situation.
Fitzgerald says these recommendations are unrealistic. If it is unrealistic for the public to demand a police department as corrupt and violent as this one be subject to civilian control and oversight, then that department needs more than reform. If this is unrealistic, we need to change the very reality of the department.
Civilian Oversight as a Tactic to Transform Policing
Some choose to push for public oversight of policing as a tactic to both diminish use of force incidents, but also to destabilize an institution that is inherently and brutally violent and racist. This often takes a long time to demonstrate. When civilian review boards are put in place, set-up without sufficient authority and then denied any ability to act autonomously, it then reveals an incompatibility between policing and democratic control of public institutions. But in this case, we see this clearly demonstrated — even prior to the failure of civilian oversight — when policing institutions powerfully resist even the facade of accountability offered by a deficient and structurally ineffective review board. City and policing officials in Troy have declared their police department to be well beyond the kind of democratic oversight and control that many civilians are demanding. This is a police department that is not consistent with any kind of democratic values. Worse yet, when provided with this situation as an opportunity for change — change demanded and backed by a substantial segment of the Troy population, a segment currently disenfranchised, and especially from overseeing police activity — Tedesco, Magnetto, Rosamilia and the rest reveal their demand to remain inconsistent with the values of democracy.
With what political and ethical values is this department, its actions, and its oversight by city officials consistent?
What do we call it when power is held by a small political group? What do we call it when the governed have no real power over decisions that are made or the execution of the law? What do we call it when those who make and enforce laws are not held to the same laws and standards as civilians? What do we call it when there is a pattern of deprivation of freedoms, especially among a defined segment of the population? What do we call it when centralized power is held by small bureaucracies, and these exercise tight control over the police?
We don’t call that a democracy. In fact, these are the textbook determinants of an authoritarian or totalitarian regime. This is not simple hyperbole. The values and ideologies that shape public institutions should be laid bare in order to evaluate the fundamental social and ethical positions that guide policy. Currently, policing is governed with a prior and unflinching commitment to authoritarian ideals, through totalitarian processes.
The categorical denial of real, authoritative public oversight of policing is contrary to even the most weak and thin conceptions of democracy. Those of us who not only want a semblance of democracy in our communities, but further demand radically democratic community, ought to expect and demand a fundamentally different model of policing and its oversight. These denials of the possibility of public oversight voiced by Tedesco — and echoed by Fitzgerald and others — demonstrate that the model of policing currently in place and declared as inviolable is fundamentally inconsistent with the values we profess to hold dear in democratic societies.
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